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Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System* 
Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker, and Kate Kraus 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Patent applications are evaluated in light of the prior art.  What this 
means is that patent examiners evaluate a claimed invention by comparing 
it with what in a rough sense corresponds to the set of ideas and inventions 
already known to the public.  This is done for three reasons.  First, the 
comparison helps to ensure that patents issue only in cases where an 
inventor has made a non-trivial contribution to the public’s store of 
knowledge.  Second, it protects a possible reliance interest on the part of 
the public since, once an invention is widely known, members of the 
public might reasonably assume that the invention is free for all to use.  
And third, it pressures inventors to file their patent applications promptly 
lest some other inventor disclose a related invention or the applicant 
himself inadvertently let slip some fraction of his own research result. 
 
 The prior art inquiry has a fourth policy implication, however, and 
while this one might not have been one of the motivating factors for 
establishing the inquiry in the first place, it is just as important when it 
comes to designing and interpreting sensible prior art rules.  That 
additional wrinkle is simply this: the fact that patent applications are 
evaluated in light of the prior art gives firms a strategic incentive to create 
prior art.  A firm can publish a journal article or engage in a public 
demonstration and in that way affect both a rival’s ability to patent a 
related invention and the rival's incentive to do so.  Perhaps surprisingly, 
this can make the disclosing firm better off even though, by revealing 
information, the firm is likely helping its rival and, worse, narrowing or 
even fully preempting the very patent it seeks. 
 
 In this Article, then, we explain the incentive for strategic 
disclosure.  We show that a firm trailing in a given patent race has an 
incentive to disclose information in the hopes of preempting a rival's 
patent, but only if the laggard itself has little chance of leapfrogging the 
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leader and winning the race.  We show that a firm leading a patent race 
similarly has an incentive to disclose, this time in an effort to reduce its 
rival's expected payoff and in that way encourage the rival to quit the race.  
We consider the possibility that private negotiations will displace public 
disclosures, for example with the laggard agreeing not to disclose and in 
exchange receiving from the ultimate patentee some form of favorable 
licensing agreement.  Lastly, we consider the implications all this might 
have for the patent system overall. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 One purpose of the patent system is to encourage firms to disclose their 
inventions to the public.  The patent system accomplishes this goal by requiring 
inventors to make meaningful disclosures as part of the patent process.  Disclosure, 
in fact, is at the heart of the patent bargain: in exchange for a "full, clear, concise, 
and exact" disclosure that enables "any person skilled in the art" to practice the 
invention, the disclosing inventor is awarded a limited exclusive right to make, 
use, and sell the same.1  In short, in order to earn patent protection, an inventor 
must teach the public how his invention works—and that, according to 
conventional wisdom, is how the patent system promotes disclosure. 
 
As a recent article in the Michigan Law Review points out, however, the 
patent system encourages disclosure in more subtle ways as well.2  In that piece, 
author Gideon Parchomovsky suggests that, because patent applications are 
evaluated in light of the prior art, a firm trailing in a given patent race has an 
incentive to disclose its research to the public.  The incentive in this case is not the 
conventional lure of a possible patent monopoly; the incentive, instead, is the 
possibility that by disclosing information the laggard will create prior art that will 
in turn narrow or even fully preempt any patent application the leader might 
ultimately file.  This is attractive from the laggard's perspective, says 
Parchomovsky, since to whatever extent the strategy is successful, the laggard will 
                                                           
1 35 U.S.C. § 112 (West 2000) (establishing enablement and best mode requirements).  As the Supreme 
Court put it in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted): 
The applicant …who is willing to reveal to the public the substance of his discovery and the 
best mode . . . of carrying out his invention is granted the right to exclude others from 
making, using, or selling the invention throughout the United States for a period of [20] 
years.  The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain . . . . [The 
inventor] may keep his invention secret and reap its fruits indefinitely. In consideration of its 
disclosure and the consequent benefit to the community, the patent is granted. 
2 Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 926 (2000). 
 3
remain free to exploit its own research results instead of being limited by a patent 
possibly granted to the race leader. 
 
 Of course, disclosures of this sort are unlikely to occur in settings where the 
leader and laggard can bargain.  As Parchomovsky himself notes,3 in these 
situations the laggard would simply threaten to disclose, and then the leader and 
laggard would reach some sort of private agreement.  For example, in exchange for 
a promise not to disclose, the laggard might demand from the leader a favorable 
licensing agreement with respect to the common invention.  Such a bargain could 
be attractive to both sides since, unlike public disclosure, a private agreement in no 
way diminishes the patent's expected value.  So, as long as the parties can agree on 
how to divide that extra surplus between them, both the laggard and the leader 
should prefer private negotiations over public revelations. 
 
Does the possibility of private negotiation, then, fully undermine the 
disclosure benefit identified above?  Parchomovsky thinks not, reasoning that in 
most cases leaders and laggards cannot effectively bargain.  Leading firms, he 
writes, will typically   
 
be unable to ascertain which [disclosure] threats are real 
and which are not.  A firm that agrees to pay off one 
competitor may find itself inundated with threats from 
others, all requiring the same treatment.  Sifting out the real 
from the fake threats may often turn out to be impossible, 
and almost always too time-consuming.  Thus, it will likely 
be in the patenting firm's best interest not to bargain at all, 
even if doing so runs the risk of being preempted.4 
 
Parchomovsky ultimately draws an analogy to a classic paper by Kenneth Arrow5 
in which Arrow explained the need for patent protection by pointing out the 
difficulties involved in bargaining over unprotected information.  Without 
disclosing that information, an inventor is unable to negotiate terms with a 
potential buyer; if the inventor discloses the information to the buyer, however, the 
inventor is left with nothing to sell.  Parchomovsky sees a similar problem in the 
strategic disclosure context and therefore concludes that private negotiations will 
not take place. 
 
                                                           
3 Id. at 948. 
4 Id. at 949-50 (footnotes omitted). 
5 See id. at 949 n.68 (discussing Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources 
for Invention, in The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity 609, 615 (1962)). 
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 In this Article, we set out to expand, formalize, and also challenge the work 
Parchomovsky has begun.  We start with the same basic intuition: the fact that 
patent applications are evaluated in light of the prior art gives firms a strategic 
incentive to disclose information to the public.  From there, however, our work 
takes us in three different directions.  First, with respect to strategic disclosure by 
laggards, our analysis of the relevant legal rules suggests that laggards will rarely 
be able to engage in this sort of spoiler strategy.  The American patent system 
tends to favor the first inventor to conceive of a given invention.  An inventor who 
is first to conceive but second to apply for the relevant patent, for example, still 
earns the patent under the American approach.  This built-in preference for the 
first inventor makes it difficult for a trailing inventor to interfere with a leading 
inventor's patent application.  In the same way the patent system would award the 
patent to the leader over the laggard, the patent system tends to protect the leader 
from the laggard's strategic disclosures.  Moreover, once this factor is accounted 
for, the only opportunities for strategic disclosure that remain available to the 
laggard seem likely to be undesirable from even the laggard's perspective.  This is 
true because the remaining opportunities tend to present themselves at times when 
the laggard still has a non-trivial chance of leapfrogging the leader and itself 
earning the patent.  That possibility makes disclosure significantly less attractive to 
the laggard; in these settings, the patent the laggard preempts may very well have 
been its own. 
 
 Second, while we are not optimistic about laggard disclosures, we find 
(somewhat surprisingly) that a firm leading a given patent race might find it in its 
own interest to strategically disclose information prior to patenting.  That is, even 
though disclosures by the leading firm might help laggards to narrow the gap, and 
even though disclosures by the leading firm might count as prior art against the 
leader's own ultimate patent application, race leaders can nevertheless benefit from 
strategic revelation.  The intuition: while such disclosures hurt the leader, they also 
benefit him by driving laggards out of the race and in that way decreasing the 
chance that one of those laggards will leapfrog the leader and win the patent.  
Disclosures can drive laggards out of the race in two ways: they can so lessen the 
expected value of the patent that the laggards no longer have sufficient incentive to 
continue the race; and they can signal the leader's relative position vis-à-vis the 
laggards, sobering information that might not otherwise be available in the often 
secretive competitive research process.6 
 
 Third and finally, unlike Parchomovsky, we remain concerned that in 
certain cases private negotiations might displace the various types of strategic 
                                                           
6 Note that disclosure can benefit the leader even in cases where the laggard remains in the race but, because 
of the disclosure, chooses to pursue the patent less vigorously. 
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disclosure discussed above.  Arrow's work does not seem to apply.  Arrow was 
considering negotiations where, if no deal could be consummated, the parties 
hoped to maintain the secrecy of their information.  Here, by contrast, if 
negotiations fail one party is typically willing to reveal its information publicly.  
Thus, if the laggard's threat is, say, that it is about to publish a scientific article 
disclosing relevant research information, then at the moment of negotiation the 
laggard need only place that article on the negotiating table.  Should the deal fall 
through, the laggard has lost nothing; after all, the laggard was planning to make 
that information public anyway, and it still can even now.  If, instead, an 
agreement can be arranged, the laggard can shred the document and share in the 
surplus created by the patent.  This is not to say that bargaining is straightforward 
in this setting—there are still issues related to credibility, enforcement, and so 
on—but only to say that the issue is more complicated than it at first appears. 
 
 Our analysis proceeds as follows.  Part II sets out the basic legal framework 
for the prior art inquiry as it applies to strategic disclosure by both laggards and 
leaders.  Part III considers disclosure strategies that might be appealing to 
laggards, modeling the incentives these firms face, evaluating the possibility of 
private bargains, and highlighting the various benefits and harms from a societal 
perspective.  Part IV does the same for disclosure strategies as they might appeal to 
leaders; and Part V concludes with some comments on directions for possible 
future work. 
 
II.  PRIOR ART IN THE PATENT SYSTEM 
 
 Prior art plays a complicated role in the patent system, largely because so 
many different types of disclosures, by so many different parties, and at so many 
different times in the inventive process, can all under appropriate circumstances 
affect patentability.  Disclosures, for example, can come in the form of published 
journal articles, unpublished but publicly available doctoral dissertations, public 
demonstrations, and even certain offers of sale.  They can originate with the 
applicant as well as unaffiliated third parties.  And they can occur before or after 
the applicant invents its claimed invention, the disclosures being relevant to the 
prior art inquiry so long as they occur before the applicant files its patent 
application.  The need to specify how all these factors interact gives rise to an 
intricate web of statutory provisions, patent office regulations, and court 
interpretations. 
 
 Many of these rules, of course, have little to do with strategic disclosure.  
For example, a traditional discussion of the prior art inquiry would start with 
section 102(a) of the Patent Act.  That section in part establishes the so-called 
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novelty requirement,7 denying patent protection in any case where the claimed 
invention "was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in 
a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by 
the applicant."8  Courts have interpreted this provision such that, today, patent 
applications are rejected for a lack of novelty if, at the time the applicant invented 
the claimed invention, there existed a single prior art reference that disclosed "each 
and every element" of the claimed invention9 and did so in such a way as to enable 
a skilled practitioner to practice the invention without undue experimentation.10  In 
other words, the novelty requirement preempts applications that claim inventions 
that literally were already known.  This means that the novelty requirement does 
not matter much in the context of strategic disclosure.  If one party actually has 
identified each and every element of a given invention and is able to disclose the 
invention in such detail that a skilled practitioner could practice the invention, that 
party typically will not disclose for the purposes of influencing another firm's 
ability to patent, but will instead itself seek the patent.11 
 
 The subsections that follow focus on the two aspects of the prior art inquiry 
that are most relevant to strategic disclosure.  The first subsection considers the so-
called "statutory bars" of section 102(b) of the Patent Act; the second examines 
section 103's nonobviousness requirement.12 
 
A.  Statutory Bars 
 
                                                           
7 A fuller discussion of the novelty requirement would consider other provisions as well, for example 35 
U.S.C. § 102(e) (anticipation by previously filed patent application). 
8 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (West 2000).  
9 See, e.g., Structural Rubber Prod. Co. v. Park Rubber Co., 749 F.2d 707, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("the 
defense of lack of novelty (i.e., 'anticipation') can only be established by a single prior art reference which 
discloses each and every element of the claimed invention"). 
10 See, e.g., Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Alza Corp, 1995 U.S. App. Lexis 28214, 11 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (a 
reference is not anticipatory if "it would have required undue experimentation for one of ordinary skill in 
the art to have made the claimed invention based on the . . . reference"). 
11 In certain cases, such a party might not desire patent protection and might therefore disclose as a way 
of stopping others from patenting.  This might happen, for example, in cases where the inventor is unsure of 
the invention's commercial value and is therefore reluctant to incur the expense of applying for a patent.  It 
might happen, too, in cases where the inventor believes that any patent application is likely to be rejected.  
The inventor might also prefer trade secret protection over patent protection, in this case not disclosing at 
all or perhaps disclosing just enough to thwart other firms' patent applications but beyond that keeping its 
research secret so as to qualify under trade secret law. 
12 For more general discussions of the prior art inquiry, see Adelman et al., Cases and Materials on 
Patent Law 203-566 (1998); Robert Merges, Patent Law and Policy 221-656 (2d. ed. 1997).  For a narrower 
discussion of the prior art rules as they specifically apply to the possibility of laggard disclosures, see 
Rebecca Eisenberg, The Promise and Perils of Strategic Prior Art Creation Through Publication: A 
Response to Professor Parchomovsky, Mich. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2000) (draft available from author).  
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 Whereas the novelty requirement mandates that a claimed invention literally 
add something new to the public's store of knowledge, the statutory bars pressure 
an inventor of something new to file his patent application promptly.  The relevant 
provision is section 102(b): 
 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . the invention was 
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country 
or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the 
date of the application for patent in the United States.13 
 
 Section 102(b) is one of the few provisions in the Act under which the first 
party to conceive a given invention can be harmed by the actions of a later 
inventor.  Specifically, that later inventor can disclose information sometime 
between the first inventor's moment of conception and the first inventor's actual 
date of filing, and while that disclosure would not at all affect the invention's 
novelty under 102(a) (after all, the invention came first and so it was literally new 
at the time of invention), that disclosure could under 102(b) bar the first inventor 
from patenting.  This is an important departure in patent law since the American 
approach generally favors the first to invent.  Section 102(b) also creates one of the 
few scenarios under which a disclosure by the patent applicant himself can 
ultimately be found to restrict the applicant's own ability to patent.  The policy 
rationale in both instances is that these rules encourage original inventors to file 
their patent applications as soon after conception as possible.  This early filing 
ensures that other inventors do not needlessly invest resources reinventing an 
invention that has already been accomplished; that the public begins to learn from 
the inventor's accomplishment as soon as possible; that the clock promptly starts to 
run on the inventor's exclusive rights; and that the public does not learn of the 
invention by accident before it is patented and think, incorrectly, that the invention 
is free for all to use. 
 
 At first blush, all this might seem irrelevant to strategic disclosure since the 
language of the statutory bars, like the language of the novelty requirement, 
requires that "the invention" be disclosed, and it was argued above in the context 
of the novelty requirement that any party with enough information to actually 
disclose the invention may as well apply for the patent instead of attempting 
strategic disclosure.  That argument does not render 102(b) irrelevant, however, 
and the reason derives from the priority the American patent system gives to the 
first inventor to conceive a given invention.  Conception under the United States 
patent system is a mental step, described as the formation "in the mind of the 
inventor of a definite and permanent idea of the complete and operative invention, 
                                                           
13 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (West 2000). 
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as it is thereafter to be applied in practice."14  The date of conception is the date 
when the invention is "crystallized in all of its essential attributes and . . . so clearly 
defined in the mind of the inventor as to be capable of being converted to reality 
and reduced to practice by the inventor or by one skilled in the art."15  The actual 
building and testing of a physical embodiment, by contrast, is termed "reduction to 
practice,"16 although if an inventor files a patent application that enables one 
skilled in the art to practice the invention, courts recognize that application as a 
"constructive" reduction to practice even if the applicant never physically 
reduced.17  Time might pass between conception and reduction to practice for any 
number of reasons, for example difficulties in the process of building the 
invention, a lack of resources, or uncertainty as to the commercial viability of the 
invention. 
 
Many of the world's patent systems reward the first inventor to apply for a 
given patent, irrespective of whether that party actually conceived first.18  This is 
done mostly for administrative convenience, since having the critical date be the 
somewhat subjective date of conception introduces complexity and uncertainty 
into the patent system, complexity and uncertainty that would be avoided were the 
critical date instead the relatively easy to determine date of filing.  But the United 
States patent system is a first-to-invent regime; thus, if the first party to conceive 
can show evidence of an earlier conception date and of "reasonable diligence" 
from its rival's date of conception through until its own reduction to practice, that 
earlier inventor will be awarded the patent even over a rival who has both reduced 
first and applied for the patent first.19  This sets up the opportunity for strategic 
disclosure under section 102(b).  In certain cases, there will be an inventor who 
will have reduced the invention to practice and thus be capable of disclosing in 
appropriate detail "each and every element" of the claimed invention but who will 
not himself be able to use that information to patent the invention because of 
patent law's priority scheme.  This inventor—ahead in the development of the 
invention but behind in the official patent race—has the incentive and ability to 
trigger the 102(b) bar. 
                                                           
14 Coleman v. Dines, 754 F. 2d 353, 359 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (quoting Gunter v. Stream, 573 F. 2d 77, 80 
(CCPA 1978)). 
15 Technitrol, Inc. v. United States, 440 F.2d 1363, 1369  (Ct. Cl. 1971). 
16 See, e.g., UMC Elecs. Co. v. United States, 816 F. 2d 647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (definition of 
"reduction to practice"). 
17 Constructive reduction to practice is discussed in Merges, supra note 12, at 425. 
18 See generally, Adelman et al., supra note 12, at 204-06.  There is a vast literature on the relative 
benefits of first-to-file versus first-to-invent regimes, as well as continued pressure in the United States to 
adopt the first-to-file approach. 
19 32 U.S.C. § 102(g) (West 2000).   
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Strategic disclosure under 102(b) is, however, difficult to accomplish.  Even 
if a laggard discloses the invention in full detail, section 102(b) gives the favored 
inventor one full year from the time of the disclosure to apply for the patent.  Thus, 
in many cases, the disclosure will not preempt the patent application, but will 
instead spur, and perhaps help, the original inventor to file.  This is not always 
true, however, because under modern interpretations an inventor can sometimes 
disclose in such a quiet way that the original inventor will not even be aware of the 
disclosure.  For example, there is some authority to suggest that publishing a paper 
in a foreign language and then making that paper available in only a single foreign 
library nevertheless constitutes sufficient disclosure for section 102(b) purposes.20  
Similarly, at least one court has found that there can be a "public use" of an 
invention even if the invention is never removed from the laboratory where it was 
first developed, the wrinkle being that the laboratory itself must be "public" in the 
sense that uninvolved employees have access to the laboratory and are under no 
explicit duty of confidentiality.21  To whatever extent these forms of "quiet" 
disclosure are sufficient to trigger section 102(b) bars, the provision can be an 
effective strategic tool for laggards.22 
 
B.  Nonobviousness 
 
 Section 103 establishes what is perhaps the most significant hurdle to 
patenting, the requirement that an invention not only be new, but also be a 
nonobvious advance over what was known before.  The section specifically 
provides: 
  
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject 
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject 
matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was 
                                                           
20 In re Hall, 781 F. 2d 897 (Fed. Cir. 1986).  
21 Baxter International v Cobe Laboratories, 88 F.3d 1054 (Fed. Cir 1996). 
22 A related form of "quiet" disclosure can be accomplished through the Statutory Invention Registration 
(SIR) procedure, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 157 (West 2000).  That procedure allows an inventor to file with 
the PTO a document describing his invention and then use that document as prior art against any later patent 
application.  This is a form of quiet disclosure since the SIR is effective as prior art as of the date that 
document is filed even if administrative delays or strategic play mean that the document is not made public 
until some time long thereafter.  To be specific, the application is prior art under section 102(e) from the 
moment it is filed until the moment the SIR is published, and prior art under 102(b) from that point onward.  
The SIR is rarely used in practice today, most likely because under European law there is no equivalent to 
"secret" section 102(e) prior art, and so this form of quiet disclosure only has effect domestically.  For 
further discussion of the strategic use of SIRs, see Eisenberg, supra note 12. 
 10
made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject 
matter pertains.23 
 
 Strategic disclosure is easier to accomplish under the nonobviousness 
requirement than it is under the statutory bars, mainly because the provision is 
applicable even if a disclosure does not capture "each and every element" of the 
claimed invention.  An inventor, in other words, can use this provision to render a 
rival's invention obvious without actually having accomplished the invention 
himself.  Indeed, the inventor can in theory affect patentability simply by adding 
one bit of information to the stockpile of information already available in the prior 
art.  Phrased another way, whereas it is difficult for a firm to raise a statutory bar 
against its rival because statutory bars must be established by a single qualifying 
reference, a firm can more easily render a rival's patent application obvious since 
obviousness can be established by combining the firm's disclosure with the 
teachings of several other references.  One caveat here is that there must exist in 
the prior art "some teaching, reason, suggestion, or motivation" to combine the 
references;24 obviousness, in other words, is not an invitation to cobble 
information together the way a kidnapper might cut and paste newspaper letters to 
form a ransom note. 
 
Two complexities limit strategic use of the nonobviousness requirement: 
the fact that, according to the statutory language at least, nonobviousness is judged 
"at the time the invention was made;" and the increased importance of certain 
objective factors that are today used to indirectly measure obviousness.  These 
limitations are considered in turn below. 
 
 To run afoul of the nonobviousness requirement, the statute requires that an 
invention must have been obvious "at the time [it] was made."25  Consistent with 
the language of section 102(a) and the patent system's rules with respect to 
conception and reduction to practice, this phrase would seem to require that, in 
order to render an invention obvious, a reference or group of references must have 
been in existence at the time the inventor conceived of his invention.  However, at 
least since Application of Foster,26 courts have interpreted this phrase more 
broadly.  Today, obviousness is judged by examining the prior art as it existed at 
the moment of conception and, in addition, as it existed one year before the 
                                                           
23 35 U.S.C. § 103 (West 2000). 
24 In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Nies, J., concurring); accord Pro-Mold & Tool 
Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
25 This is the text of section 103. 
26 Application of Foster, 343 F.2d 980 (C.C.P.A. 1965).  For evidence that this same idea predates 
Foster, see infra note 28. 
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relevant patent application was filed.27  This seems to depart from the language of 
section 103 and also seems to blur the distinction between section 102(b) and 
section 103, but the Federal Circuit has adopted this view and even goes so far as 
to label certain references "102(b)/103" prior art.28 
 
 All this is reflected in Patent Office Rule 131.29  That rule allows an 
inventor to "swear behind," and thus eliminate for the purposes of section 103, a 
given prior art reference by showing that the inventor conceived the invention 
before the reference came into existence and worked diligently from the date the 
reference came into existence until either a subsequent reduction to practice or the 
inventor's actual filing of its patent application.30  Implementing the Foster 
interpretation, however, the rule explicitly states that it does not apply to 
references dated "more than one year prior" to the date on which the patent 
application was filed.31 
 
 Where does that leave things?  First, even if section 103 were interpreted so 
as to include only those prior art references that were in existence at the moment of 
conception, strategic use of the nonobviousness provision would still be possible.  
Conception, after all, is a technical concept, and so inventors can never be sure that 
their progress up to a given point—let alone the evidence thereof32—constitutes 
adequate "conception" for the purposes of establishing priority in the patent 
system.  Inventors must therefore take into account the possibility that they have 
not yet legally conceived when they react to disclosures by other inventors.  Also, 
conception takes place late in the inventive process, and thus much of the "patent 
                                                           
27 There are some exceptions to this broad statement, but none are relevant to strategic disclosure.  For a 
more nuanced discussion, see Adelman et al., supra note 12, at 531-66. 
28 See, e.g., LaBounty Mfg., Inc. v. United States, 958 F.2d 1066, 1071 n.3 (Fed.Cir.1992) (using 
phrase); Lough v. Brunswick Corp., 86 F.3d 1113, 1121 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (explaining 102(b)/103 
relationship).  The modern cases ultimately trace back to Dix-Seal Corp. v. New Haven Trap Rock Co., 236 
F. Supp. 914 (D. Conn. 1964), where the court allowed a reference to trigger a section 102(b) bar even 
though the reference did not anticipate "each and every element" of the claimed invention.  To require 
literal identity under 102(b), explained the court, would be to make the section a "paper defense" (id. at 
919), too easily evaded by clever inventors.  The modern approach accomplishes this same policy goal, 
albeit articulating the principle under section 103 as opposed to explaining it in the context of section 
102(b). 
29 Codified at 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (West 2000). 
30 In fact, the applicant need only show that, as of the date the prior art reference came into existence, 
the applicant had conceived of as much of the invention as the reference itself discloses.  See In Re Stryker, 
435 F.2d 1340 (C.C.P.A. 1971).  
31 37 C.F.R. § 1.131(a)(1) (West 2000). 
32 On the difficulties and importance of corroboration, see, e.g., Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, 
148 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).  
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race" is in fact a race to conceive.  During this part of the race, obviousness is an 
issue and section 103 can be used strategically.33   
 
 Second, to whatever extent obviousness can be established by prior art that 
comes into existence after conception but a year or more before filing, the 
discussion from the preceding subsection applies: like prior art under 102(b), prior 
art of this sort gives the earlier inventor one full year from the time of disclosure to 
apply for the patent.  This limits the strategic value of this sort of prior art, both 
because it does not take effect for an entire year, and because during that year the 
rival can use the disclosed information and in that way possibly progress more 
quickly toward the patent.  Moreover, if the inventor cannot successfully file 
within one year of the disclosure, the inventor likely will have a strong argument 
that the invention was not, in fact, made obvious by that disclosure.34 
 
 Even where obviousness is open to strategic manipulation, disclosure can 
be a double-edged sword.  The courts measure obviousness in part by turning to 
several "objective" or "secondary" factors,35 some of which might interact with 
strategic disclosure to make an invention look less obvious, not more.  For 
instance, one of the objective factors is whether other inventors have attempted to 
accomplish the same invention but failed.36  The Federal Circuit has gone so far as 
to call this factor "virtually irrefutable" evidence of nonobviousness,37 and even 
commentators critical of other objective factors have been largely supportive of 
                                                           
33 The uncertainty inherent in the concept of conception, and the fact that conception typically occurs 
late in the inventive process, are both illustrated by Gould v. Schawlow, 363 F.2d 908 (C.C.P.A. 1966), a 
case involving one of the inventors of basic laser technology.  The inventor at issue kept detailed notes of 
his invention as he developed it, even going so far as to have each page dated and notarized.  But when it 
came time to enforce his patent, the inventor was unable to establish a sufficiently early date of conception 
because his notebook, while describing the invention in great detail, neglected to make explicit the fact that 
one particular component was transparent.  The court ruled that the notebooks, which inarguably described 
the invention to a significant degree, were nevertheless too ambiguous on this one point and therefore 
conception was deemed not to have occurred. 
34 One caveat here: as it was under section 102(b), under section 103 firms do have some ability to 
disclose quietly, making disclosures that are "public" in the eyes of the law but are so obscure that a rival is 
unlikely to detect them.  Disclosures of this sort do not inform rivals, something that might be appealing to 
laggards (who disclose merely to block rival patent applications) but is likely unappealing to leaders (who 
typically want laggards to know of and react to any disclosures).  
35 A well-known and somewhat critical discussion of the objective factors is Edmund Kitch, Graham v. 
John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, 1966 Supreme Court Rev. 293.  
36 See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 816 F. 2d 617, 622 (1987) (that defendant 
"tried but failed" to develop patented invention is evidence of its nonobviousness). 
37 Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F. 2d 1082, 1099 (Fed. Cir. 1985), vacated on other 
grounds, 475 U.S. 809 (1996). 
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using "failure of others" as an indicator of patentable invention.38  In the context of 
strategic disclosure, a disclosure designed to make a later patent claim seem 
obvious might therefore backfire, itself providing evidence that another firm was 
competing to accomplish the same invention but had failed to do so at the time of 
the disclosure.  
 
 Other objective factors might limit the effectiveness of strategic disclosure 
as well.  For instance, copying is often considered strong evidence of 
nonobviousness.39  Combined with "failure of others," this creates a catch-22: if a 
firm discloses information in an attempt to make a rival's invention look obvious 
but then continues to struggle to achieve the invention, that activity might be 
interpreted as evidence of nonobviousness under "failure of others"; if, instead, the 
firm does not continue to work on the invention but simply waits and copies its 
rival's accomplishment, that too might be interpreted as evidence of 
nonobviousness, this time as copying.  A firm's only safe strategy, in fact, is to stop 
pursuing the invention entirely—in many instances an unattractive alternative.  In 
short, the objective factors make strategic disclosure for the purposes of rendering 
an invention obvious a somewhat difficult task. 
 
The above analysis primarily focuses on 103 prior art as it might be used by 
a trailing inventor seeking to spoil a leading firm's patent application; but 103 also 
has features that affect a leading firm's ability to strategically disclose information.  
As was mentioned in the Introduction, a firm leading a patent race might want to 
disclose information (among other reasons) as a way of signaling to other firms 
that the leader is in fact so far ahead that the other firms may as well exit the race.  
Doing so can benefit the leader in a variety of ways; for example, it might decrease 
the danger that one of those trailing inventors will leapfrog the leader and win the 
patent.  Section 103 makes this signaling less costly by, in certain situations, 
allowing a patent applicant to disclose information without that disclosure at all 
affecting the applicant's own ability to patent.  The most prominent example here 
is the exception40 recognized under 103/102(b)41 for certain disclosures that are 
part of the inventor's experimental process.  In City of Elizabeth v. American 
                                                           
38 See, e.g, Robert Merges, Economic Perspectives on Innovation: Patent Standards and Commercial 
Success, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 803 (1988). 
39 See, e.g., Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
40 There is some controversy in the case law over whether this should be thought of as an "exception" to 
the general rule with respect to public uses or a "negation" of what would otherwise be a public use.  See 
Adelman et al., supra note 12, at 243-44. 
41 Technically, the experimental use exception is a 102(b) concept; but, since Foster, this 102(b) prior 
art is prior art for 103 purposes as well; hence the text discussion.  Note that a leading firm is unlikely to use 
the experimental use exception under 102(b) directly; after all, a leader capable of doing so may as well go 
ahead and patent. 
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Nicholson Pavement Co.,42 for instance, the inventor of a particular type of 
pavement made a public (and credible) display of his invention by allowing it to be 
tested on a major avenue in Boston for a period of six years.  This use was deemed 
to not create prior art against the inventor's ultimate patent application, however, 
on the grounds that the use was designed to confirm the pavement's utility.43  That 
was likely true, but the use had another important effect: it served to warn rival 
inventors of this inventor's accomplishment.44  
 
Prior art rules are not always so forgiving of disclosures by the ultimate 
patent applicant; in certain cases, signaling will come at the cost of partial 
preemption.  Suppose, for example, that an inventor develops a process for 
changing the properties of a certain type of metal, but that—while access to the 
changed metal is credible evidence that the inventor has developed the process—
access to the changed metal in no way reveals how the process itself works.45  
Under current law, if the inventor sells or makes public use of the changed metal, 
that sale or use counts as 102(b)/103 prior art even though the innovative process 
is not thereby made public.  The policy rationale is that an inventor should not be 
permitted to in essence "extend the period of his monopoly"46 by profiting from the 
output of an innovative process while keeping the process itself secret.47  This rule 
severely limits what would otherwise be an appealing method of signaling.  After 
all, in these cases the output of the process effectively informs rivals of the 
inventor's accomplishment but does so without helping them to emulate it. 
 
 
III.  STRATEGIC DISCLOSURE BY LAGGARDS 
 
The legal analysis presented in the preceding section now allows us to 
define more rigorously the incentives and opportunities faced by trailing firms.  
We do that here in three steps.  First, we present a formal model.  The purpose of 
the model is both to show that strategic disclosure can indeed benefit the laggard 
and to better isolate the factors relevant to the laggard's disclosure decision.  Next, 
we integrate that understanding back into the richer legal analysis, arguing not only 
                                                           
42 97 U.S. 126 (1877). 
43 Id. at 136. 
44 The Court's summary of the law makes clear that the experimental use exception can be used for 
signaling: "[i]t is not a public knowledge of [an] invention that precludes the inventor from obtaining a 
patent for it, but a public use or sale of it."  Id. at 136. 
45 The fact pattern discussed in the text is a simplified version of the facts in Metallizing Engineering 
Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co., 153 F. 2d 516 (2d. Cir. 1946). 
46 Id. at 519. 
47 D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 714 F. 2d 1144, 1147 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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that strategic disclosure is difficult for laggards to accomplish under current legal 
rules, but also that, where strategic disclosure is possible, it likely will be 
undesirable from the laggard's own perspective.  Recognizing that legal rules are 
subject to change, we consider in the third and final subsection whether strategic 
disclosure by trailing firms might be socially desirable.  Critically important to this 
analysis, it turns out, is the question of whether trailing firms would actually 
engage in disclosure or whether they would, instead, simply threaten to disclose as 
a way of extracting from the leader a favorable licensing agreement or some other 
form of Coasean bribe. 
 
A.  A Game Theoretic Model of Laggard Disclosure 
 
Denote as A and B two firms engaged in a patent race.  Let x represent the 
expected value of the patent assuming no disclosures prior to patenting, and let xα  
represent the expected value of the patent if one of the firms uses disclosure to 
narrow or fully preempt the patent.  Naturally, ]1,0[∈α .  Throughout the patent 
race, each firm is unsure of its rival's progress, and thus the game is one of 
incomplete information.  The patent race proceeds in three successive stages.  
There is an initial research stage; during this stage, a firm that chooses to invest ic1  
(where },{ BAi∈ ) completes a certain amount of research with probability 1p .  
Then there is a disclosure stage where each firm simultaneously decides whether to 
disclose some fraction of the information it learned in the first stage.  Finally, there 
is a second research stage where the firms can each invest ic2  and have some 
probability of earning the patent, with each firm's exact probability depending both 
on its rival's position and on the firm's own results from the first stage.48 
 
 This model focuses on disclosures by trailing firms, so in this game only a 
firm that attempts but fails to complete the first stage of research is given the 
option to disclose its (incomplete) results.  Later in the Article, we present a 
parallel model where a firm that successfully completes the first stage of research 
has the option to disclose.  Disclosure in this model has two effects: it reduces the 
expected value of the patent from x to xα ; and it allows the laggard to compete 
with the leading firm in some subset market, specifically the market consisting of 
all products that are no longer eligible for patenting.  Of course, if the laggard ends 
up being just one of many firms working in this subset market, that ability to 
compete will be of little worth.  However, there is some chance that the laggard's 
                                                           
48 For a model similar to the one presented here, see Fudenburg et al., Preemption, Leapfrogging, and 
Competition in Patent Races, 22 European Economic Review 3 (1983).  A more general overview of the 
patent race literature can be found in Jennifer F. Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation: Research, 
Development, and Diffusion, in 1 Handbook of Industrial Organization at Chapter 14 (Richard Schmalensee 
& Robert D. Willig, eds., 1989). 
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involvement in the research process will give it a special advantage in the subset 
market and thus it will earn above-market returns.  Let v represent the expected 
value of those returns.   
 
Payoffs, then, work as follows.  After a laggard disclosure, the laggard is 
guaranteed a payoff of v from the subset market.  In addition, if the laggard 
chooses to pursue the partially preempted patent and is successful in that attempt, 
it earns an additional payoff of xα .  The leader similarly expects a payoff of v from 
the subset market after a laggard disclosure; and the leader also has a chance of 
earning xα  from the partially preempted patent.  Because the patent is more 
valuable intact than it is when partially preempted, we know that 
 
xvx α+> 2  
  
or, rearranging the terms, that ])1(,0[ 21 xv α−∈ . 
 
 Whether a firm wins the patent race depends upon its relative position vis-à-
vis its rival.  The rival's position, however, is private information.  The likelihood, 
then, that a firm that invests ic2  in the final stage of the race receives the patent 
can be represented as follows: 
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where the subscript "a" indicates that firm i is ahead, “b” indicates that firm i is 
behind, "s" indicates that both firms have successfully completed stage one, and 
“f” indicates that both firms have failed to complete stage one.  These probabilities 
are obviously related; specifically: 
 
01 >>>>> bfsa pppp . 
 
Note that, even if its rival has not completed the first stage of research, a 
firm's probability of receiving the patent is not one.  There is always some chance 
that the leading firm will fail to receive the patent either because (a) the leader gets 
leapfrogged by the rival firm or (b) the leader's research results at stage two do not 
qualify for patent protection.  Moreover, even if both firms fail to successfully 
complete stage one, at the second research stage each still has a chance of earning 
the patent.  That is, completion of the first research stage is not a necessary 
precondition for patenting.  What completion of the first research stage does is 
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serve as a place marker; if firm i has completed stage one and its rival has not, firm 
i is ahead in the patent race.  
  
 In order to solve this game of incomplete information, we use the perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium solution concept.49  That is, we assume that at each node 
where a player makes a decision, the player maximizes its expected payoff given 
the strategy choices and beliefs of all players.  The beliefs of any given player are 
derived according to two rules: (1) whenever an information set is on the 
equilibrium path, the beliefs are based on the equilibrium strategies and the 
observed actions, with updates according to Bayes' rule; and (2) whenever an 
information set is off the equilibrium path, the beliefs constitute a probability 
distribution over all possible types.   
 
Our purpose here, then, is to show that there exists a separating equilibrium, 
by which we mean a set of strategies for each firm from which neither can deviate 
(taking as given the actions and beliefs of its rival) and increase its payoff.  An 
equilibrium is said to be separating if a player's observable actions perfectly reveal 
that player's private information.  In our game, a separating equilibrium would 
have every firm that fails to complete stage one disclose; each firm would thus 
learn from its rival's disclosure decision whether or not the rival has successfully 
completed stage one.  Other types of equilibria—for example, pooling equilibria 
and semi-separating equilibria—are also possible for this game; we focus here on 
separating equilibria, however, because a pooling equilibrium would identify only 
those cases where disclosure is not attractive to laggards, and a semi-separating 
equilibrium would identify only those cases where laggards are indifferent 
between disclosing and not disclosing.  The separating equilibrium, then, 
highlights what are likely to be the most interesting and relevant cases. 
 
As is the case with most games of incomplete information, however, in our 
game there is more than one separating equilibrium.  Specifically, there are two 
separating equilibria where a firm always discloses upon failing to complete the 
first research stage.  In one, the firm discloses and then stays in the patent race, 
hoping to leapfrog its rival and receive the now partially preempted patent.  In the 
other, the firm discloses but then exits the patent race.  To formally state and prove 
both of these equilibria would be somewhat redundant, thus we restrict our focus 
here to the first of the two.  Both, of course, are related.  As is made clear below, 
what turns out to be critical in each is the relationship between the probability of 
leapfrogging ( bp ), the value of being to able to compete in the subset market (v), 
                                                           
49 See Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, Game Theory (MIT Press 1991) at 325-26. 
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and the extent to which disclosure reduces patent value (α ). With all that in mind, 
we now pose and prove the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 1:  There exists, for certain parameter configurations, a separating 
equilibrium where a firm that fails to complete stage one engages in strategic 
disclosure.  In this equilibrium, each firm invests at the first research stage; a firm 
that fails to complete stage one discloses information; and both firms invest at the 
second research stage. 
 
 To prove that this is an equilibrium, we must show that neither firm can, 
given its beliefs and the equilibrium strategy of its rival, deviate from its 
equilibrium strategy and increase its payoff. 50  To do that, we begin at the final 
stage of the game, the second research stage.   
 
At the second research stage, a firm that has neither successfully completed 
stage one nor observed disclosure by its rival knows that it is behind in the race.  
This is true because, according to the equilibrium strategies, any firm that fails to 
complete stage one will disclose.51  Thus, a firm that fails to disclose must have 
successfully completed stage one.  A firm behind in the race will nevertheless 
invest at the second research stage if the expected payoff from investing is greater 
than the expected payoff from not investing, or so long as: 
 
ib cxp 2)1( >α . 
  
The left-hand side of equation (1) represents the firm’s expected benefit from 
investing at the second research stage given that it has disclosed (as per the 
equilibrium strategy) and is behind in the race.  The right-hand side of equation (2) 
represents the cost of investing at the second research stage. 
 
 Recall that a firm trailing in the patent race has the smallest chance of 
receiving the patent.  If equation (1) holds, it is optimal for this laggard to invest at 
the second research stage.  Given that, then it must also be optimal for a firm in 
any other position in the race (e.g., ahead in the race or tied) to invest at the second 
research stage.   
 
                                                           
50 The equilibrium strategy for both firms is: invest at stage one, disclose upon a failure to complete 
stage one, and always invest at stage two. 
51 We will show later in the proof that it is indeed optimal for a firm that fails to complete stage one to 
disclose.  But, as with most proofs in sequential games, we start with the final stage of the game and work 
our way backward. 
 19
 Taking a step backward, we must now show that it is optimal for a firm that 
failed to complete stage one to disclose.  The expected payoff from disclosure, 
taking as given the equilibrium strategy of the rival firm, is: 
 
ifbdisclosure cxpvpxpvpEP 211 ])[1()( −+−++= αα . 
 
This expected payoff consists of three terms.  The first term is the payoff from 
competition in the subset market (v) plus the expected payoff, after there has been 
disclosure, from investing at stage two given that the firm is behind in the race.  
The firm's belief that it is behind in the race discounts this payoff.52  The second 
term is the payoff from competition in the subset market (v) plus the expected 
payoff from investing at stage two, after there has been disclosure, and if neither 
firm has successfully completed stage one.  The firm's belief that its rival also has 
failed to complete stage one discounts this payoff.  The third and final term is the 
cost of investing in the second stage of research. 
 
 Similarly, the expected payoff from a failure to disclose, given the 
equilibrium strategy of the rival firm, is: 
 
ifbDisclosureNo cxpvpxppEP 211 ])[1()( −+−+= α . 
 
Like the payoff to disclosure, the expected payoff from a failure to disclosure 
consists of three terms.  The first term is the payoff if the firm ends up behind in 
the race and does not disclose.  The firm's belief that it is behind in the race 
discounts this term.  The second term is the payoff if both firms fail to complete 
stage one.  In this case, according to the rival’s equilibrium strategy, it will 
disclose.  This results in a payoff to the non-disclosing firm of v (from competition 
in the subset market) plus the expected payoff from investing at stage two, given 
that there has been disclosure (hence the xα ) and both firms have failed to 
complete the first stage (hence the fp ).  The firm's belief that its rival has failed to 
complete stage one discounts this payoff.  The third term again represents the costs 
associated with stage two research. 
 
                                                           
52 This belief is derived from the equilibrium strategy of the rival firm in accordance with the perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium concept.  The equilibrium strategies specify that each firm chooses to invest at stage 
one.  Thus, the chance that the rival firm has successfully completed stage one is 1p .  At the time a firm 
makes its disclosure decision, it has not yet observed whether its rival has disclosed since these decisions 
are made simultaneously.  Thus, at this point, any firm that failed stage one only has a probabilistic belief 
that its rival has successfully completed stage one.  In short, no private information has been revealed 
before the firm makes its disclosure decision. 
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 Comparing these two expected payoffs, we see that disclosure is optimal for 
a firm that fails to complete stage one so long as: 
 
xpv b )1()2( α−> . 
 
This is an important equation for understanding strategic disclosure; but, before we 
discuss it, let us complete the final stage of the proof and show that, given the 
equilibrium strategies, it is optimal for a firm to invest in stage one in the first 
place.  Investment at stage one is optimal so long as the expected payoff to 
investing is greater than the cost; in other words, so long as the following 
condition holds: 
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Although somewhat inelegant, equation (3) is easy to understand.  It simply 
states that the sum of the expected payoffs given the four possible states of the 
world—both firms complete stage one; the firm in question fails to complete stage 
one whereas its rival succeeds; the firm in question succeeds whereas its rival fails; 
and neither firm completes stage one—minus the costs of investing in stage two 
add up to something more than the costs of entering the patent race in the first 
place.  If equation (3) holds then firms will enter the race; and if equations (1) and 
(2) also hold, then firms in the race cannot increase their expected payoffs by 
deviating from the equilibrium strategy of disclosing if they fail the first stage and, 
no matter what, investing in stage two.  Under these conditions, the strategies 
specified in proposition 1 constitute a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. 
 
 Now, what does all this mean for our overall understanding of strategic 
disclosure by laggards?  Equations (1)-(3) are the conditions that must be satisfied 
for disclosure to be optimal in the current equilibrium.  Equation (3) is messy but 
trivial; again, all that it requires is that the firms find it attractive to invest at the 
outset given the costs of stage one research.  Equation (1) can also be set aside.  
That equation stipulates that a laggard finds it worthwhile to continue the patent 
race even after disclosing—a condition that must hold in the particular equilibrium 
we chose to examine, but a condition that, if violated, would simply send us to the 
other equilibrium articulated in the discussion just before proposition 1. 
 
 The real insight of the model, then, comes from equation (2).  That equation 
makes clear that, ultimately, it is the relationship between v, xα , and bp  that 
determines whether strategic disclosure will be in the laggard's interest.  The 
greater the chance that the laggard can leapfrog the leader and himself earn the 
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patent (that is, the larger bp ), the less likely it is that strategic disclosure will be 
attractive to the laggard.  Indeed, in the extreme case, if the chance of leapfrogging 
exceeds fifty percent the condition can never be satisfied—intuitively because in 
that case the laggard is not a laggard in any meaningful sense.53  All else held 
constant,54 smaller values for v lower the critical leapfrog probability, so as the 
guaranteed payoff from the subset market diminishes, the attraction of strategic 
disclosure lessens, exactly as intuition would suggest.  Similarly, all else held 
constant, higher values for xα  make strategic disclosure more attractive, this time 
because the higher values mean that disclosure does not cost the laggard much in 
terms of destroyed patent value.  
 
B.  The Incentive and Opportunity for Strategic Disclosure by Laggards 
 
At the start of the Article, we made the intuitive point that a firm trailing in 
a given patent race might disclose information in the hopes of narrowing or even 
fully preempting a rival's patent application.  As we argued then and the above 
model now makes more precise, the allure to the laggard is that, to whatever extent 
the strategy is successful, the laggard will be free to make use of any research 
results it had in common with its rival, competing in some subset market based on 
the products and services now no longer eligible for patenting.  The main cost to 
the laggard is that its disclosures will undermine its own ability to patent just as the 
disclosures undermine its rival's ability to do so, although there is probably a 
secondary cost associated with the fact that the laggard's disclosures will in some 
cases help other firms, including the rival, pursue related projects.  To weigh these 
competing effects in the context of the law introduced in Part II, this section begins 
by considering separately two types of laggards: the conventional laggard who is a 
laggard only because it trails its rival in terms of their relative research 
accomplishments but who can, in theory, leapfrog the rival and earn the patent 
itself; and the legal laggard, who may or may not trail in a literal sense but who 
cannot patent because a rival has legal priority thanks to an earlier date of 
conception and appropriate diligence.55 
 
                                                           
53 The condition cannot be satisfied in this instance because, as we explained at the start, 
])1(,0[ 21 xv α−∈ . 
54 Of course, α and v are at least loosely related, since the larger the subset market carved out by a 
given disclosure, the larger the payoff from working in that market (v) and the smaller the residual patent 
value ( xα ).  
55 The firm must show diligence from the moment its rival conceived through to either the time of its 
own reduction to practice or the filing of its own patent application.  35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (West 2000). 
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 The conventional laggard is conducting research at a time when neither it 
nor its rivals have conceived.  This firm thus has the broadest options when it 
comes to strategic disclosure.  It can raise a statutory bar under section 102(b) if 
one of its disclosures turns out to describe identically the leader's invention.  It can 
also render the invention obvious under even a literal interpretation of section 103, 
at least so long as the objective factors do not cut the other way.  While the spoiler 
strategy is thus legally permissible in this setting, the model presented in the 
previous section raises serious doubt as to whether disclosure would ever actually 
be attractive to a conventional laggard.  After all, the gains to the laggard are 
modest at best: by blocking the patent, the laggard—as well as any other firm—is 
free to compete in the subset market consisting of all products no longer eligible 
for patenting.  True, the laggard might be in an especially good position to 
capitalize on this opportunity, having actually engaged in research related to this 
market; but the laggard's lack of intellectual property rights, combined with the 
public disclosures that are part of the strategy,56 would seem to invite competition 
and thus severely limit the value of this opportunity for the laggard.  The upside to 
strategic disclosure, then, is limited in this setting; but the downside to strategic 
disclosure might be significant.  After all, the conventional laggard has not yet lost 
the patent race.  There is still at this point a chance that the laggard will leapfrog 
the leader, be first to conceive, and himself earn the patent.  Even if this were only 
a small chance, from an ex ante perspective it seems likely that a small chance at a 
big payoff would be worth more to the laggard than a guaranteed opportunity for a 
small to modest payoff—an intuition that equation (2) confirms. 
 
The legal laggard, by contrast, is in a significantly different position from 
the conventional laggard since, for the legal laggard, there is little downside to 
disclosure.  By definition, the legal laggard cannot patent the common invention 
because its rival has priority.  Thus, even if the legal laggard were to leapfrog its 
rival and reduce the invention to practice first, it would have no chance of earning 
intellectual property rights.  Disclosure, then, can be attractive to the legal laggard.  
The upside is again the ability to compete in some subset market, and the downside 
is only that any disclosure might help other firms, including the rival, understand 
the common invention.   
 
For the legal laggard, however, strategic disclosure is almost impossible to 
accomplish.  Because its rival has already conceived, Rule 131 applies and in 
essence gives the leading firm one full year from the time of a laggard disclosure 
                                                           
56 We intentionally assume here that there will be public disclosure instead of private bargaining.  This 
is the correct assumption because we are trying to determine whether a laggard's disclosure threat is 
consistent with the laggard's own interests.  If it is, that credible threat might indeed lead to private 
negotiations instead of public disclosures—a possibility we turn to in due course, infra Section III.c. 
 23
before section 103 kicks in.  Section 102(b) also gives the rival a full year to file, 
so strategic disclosure for the legal laggard unavoidably involves a one year delay.  
During that year, the earlier inventor is free to file its patent application and claim 
exclusive rights to the disclosed invention, fully thwarting the laggard's strategy.  
Worse, it is possible that the laggard's disclosure will help the leader complete that 
application, and, as was explained above, because of the objective factors the 
laggard's disclosure might in certain cases itself be treated as evidence that the 
leader's accomplishment was, in fact, nonobvious.  
 
The distinction between the conventional laggard and the legal laggard 
should not be taken too literally, of course.  In practice, uncertainty likely means 
that laggards recognize that there is some chance that they are legal laggards and 
some chance that they are conventional laggards.  The firms surely adjust their 
strategies accordingly.  Similarly, because conception is such a subjective legal 
concept, leading firms can never be sure that they have conceived.  Thus, they, too, 
will react to disclosures by taking into account both possibilities.  All of the costs, 
benefits, and legal limitations discussed above, then, are likely factored in each 
time a laggard considers employing the spoiler strategy and each time a leader then 
reacts to that disclosure. 
 
C.  Policy Implications and Private Bargaining 
 
 While strategic disclosure by laggards is thus overall somewhat unlikely to 
occur under current legal rules, changes in the prior art inquiry could make the 
strategy both more workable and more attractive to laggards.  In this final 
subsection, we conclude our analysis of the strategy by asking whether such 
changes deserve consideration; that is, we ask whether a patent system that gave 
trailing firms more opportunities for strategic disclosure might better serve patent 
system goals than the current, less tolerant regime. 
 
 From a societal perspective, the main benefit to the spoiler strategy is the 
obvious one, namely that it furthers one of the patent system's basic goals, 
encouraging firms to disclose their inventive accomplishments to the public.  
Traditionally, the patent system has accomplished this goal through the lure of 
patent protection: in exchange for a sufficiently informative disclosure, inventors 
are given a limited legal monopoly over their disclosed inventions.  But monopoly 
is an expensive way to promote disclosure.  Monopolists, after all, maximize their 
own welfare by restricting the use of their invention and selling rights to make, 
use, and sell the invention at prices in excess of marginal cost.  This is why 
strategic disclosure might be attractive from a societal perspective.  Unlike 
disclosures purchased at the cost of monopoly, the disclosures that come as part of 
strategic disclosure immediately place the relevant ideas into the public domain, 
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free for all to use and free for all to further develop.  These disclosures also occur 
much earlier in the inventive process than do typical patent system disclosures.  
Those disclosures await not only the filing of a patent application but also the 
actual approval of that application and the issuance of the related patent.  While an 
amendment to the Patent Act slated to take effect in November of 2000 will 
accelerate this process by making patent applications public eighteen months after 
their filing regardless of the status of the underlying patents,57 strategic disclosure 
still in most cases represents an opportunity for significantly accelerated 
disclosure.  True, the disclosures made under the spoiler strategy might be slightly 
less complete than the disclosures that would have taken place as part of the 
normal patent process; but they cannot be too incomplete.  If they were, they 
would not preempt under sections 102(b) or 103.   
 
All this suggests that strategic disclosure by laggards might be attractive 
from a societal perspective.  To know for sure, two other issues have to be 
addressed.  First, the patent system is today a winner-take-all incentive system in 
which the firm that wins the patent race is awarded a patent and even a close 
second-place finisher earns no reward whatsoever from the patent system.58  
Strategic disclosure would reshape this structure a bit, changing incentives by 
increasing the expected payoff to laggards (who would now have the option of 
using strategic disclosure to earn profits in the subset market) and decreasing the 
expected payoff to ultimate patentees (who would now have to account for the 
possibility that their patents would be partially preempted).  Whether these shifts 
are desirable, harmful, or even significant is hard to know.  On the one hand, 
winner-take-all regimes typically induce excessive entry,59 and, in the patent 
system in particular, they also seem to encourage firms to select research paths that 
are more risky than is socially desirable since, for the firms, "what matters is to be 
first, not how far behind one finishes in the patent race."60  On the other hand, the 
                                                           
57 The change will be reflected in 35 U.S.C. § 122, effective November 29, 2000, as per Act of Nov. 29, 
1999, P.L. 106-113, Div B, 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1536 (enacting into law 4502(a) of Subtitle E of Title IV 
of S. 1948 (113 Stat. 1501A-561)). 
58 Second-place finishers of course do not leave the race empty-handed; they surely enjoy some 
educational benefits from the process of competing, they have the possibility of pursuing spin-off research, 
and so on.  Nevertheless, for a criticism of the winner-take-all nature of the patent system, see Douglas 
Lichtman, The Economics of Innovation: Protecting Unpatentable Goods, 81 Minnesota L. Rev. 693, 717 
n.67 (1997). 
59 This point was first made in Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 Am. Econ. Rev. 845 
(1981).  A more accessible discussion can be found in Robert H. Frank & Philip J. Cook, The Winner-
Take-All Society 9, 102-26 (1995). 
60 Jean Tirole, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 396 (1989).  For a fuller articulation of the 
somewhat controversial claim that the patent system might cause firms to choose excessively risky research 
paths, see P. Dasgupta & J. Stiglitz, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure, and the Speed of R&D, 11 BELL J. OF 
ECON. 1 (1980). 
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patent system is self-consciously designed as a winner-take-all regime, and so—
without a richer theory of how the patent system works, something far beyond the 
scope of this project—we cannot be sure whether the shift in the incentive 
structure weighs in favor or against strategic disclosure. 
 
Second, and more relevant to the current Article, if the only clear societal 
benefit from strategic disclosure is that it brings research into the public domain 
earlier than the patent system otherwise would, an important question in the 
normative analysis is to ask whether the incentive to engage in strategic disclosure 
would actually lead to public disclosure or whether, instead, the incentive would 
simply form the backdrop for private negotiations between laggards and leaders.  
As we explained in the Introduction, such private negotiations might be appealing 
to the parties since public disclosure destroys patent value, value that the parties 
could share if they were to resolve their differences privately.61  Private 
negotiations would, however, eliminate much of the allure of strategic disclosure 
from a policy standpoint.  Indeed, where private negotiations displace public 
disclosures, the spoiler strategy would not only fail to deliver on the promise of 
accelerated public disclosures, it would also likely delay disclosure since, with the 
laggard and leader in essence colluding, the pace of the patent race would surely 
be diminished. 
  
In theory, private negotiations between leaders and laggards are possible.  
For example, if a laggard were planning to publish a journal article and in that way 
preempt a rival's patent, the laggard could first bring a copy of that article to its 
rival's attention and offer to commit by contract not to disclose that information in 
exchange for, say, a favorable licensing agreement on the related technology.  One 
might object that, in certain settings at least, the laggard would have trouble 
identifying its rival; but that is surely a manageable problem since, in the worst 
case, the laggard can always publicly reveal some tiny fraction of its research and 
thereby attract the leader's attention.  One might further object that Arrow's oft-
cited concern about the difficulty of negotiating over unprotected information 
would derail any negotiation attempt.  Arrow's concern was that, without 
disclosing its research information, an inventor is unable to negotiate terms with a 
potential buyer; but, if the inventor discloses its research information to the buyer, 
the inventor is left with nothing to sell.  As was pointed out in the Introduction, 
                                                           
61 We say that private negotiations might be appealing, as opposed to being confident that they will be 
appealing, because in cases where new firms can still enter the patent race, the current leader might prefer 
public disclosure.  The reason is that private bargains increase the expected payoff to race participants.  
That extra payoff might attract entry, and those entrants might ultimately either leapfrog the current leader 
or themselves demand bribes.  Knowing this, the leader might be better off simply allowing laggards to 
disclose.  (The effect is difficult to predict without further modeling since entry has other effects as well, for 
example it likely decreases v, the expected payoff in the subset market.) 
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however, Arrow's concern does not apply in this setting.  The laggard loses 
nothing by showing its rival the article; the laggard is prepared to reveal that 
information anyway if the negotiation falls through.62 
 
Several limitations make negotiations like these unlikely, however.  For one 
thing, standard impediments to bargaining—for example, private information, 
bilateral monopoly, and free-rider problems—all can interfere with negotiations of 
the sort described above.  That is, the parties might have trouble negotiating a deal 
because they disagree on the effects any given publication might have or on the 
commercial value of the disputed patent.63  Even if they agree on the size of the 
surplus, they might have trouble agreeing on how to split it, with each firm holding 
out for a larger share.64  And, in cases where there are more than two firms 
involved in the patent race, some firms might be less than forthcoming in the 
bargaining process, hoping to free-ride on other firms' efforts.65  All of these 
standard problems are exacerbated in this setting due to the extreme time pressure 
laggards would feel during any negotiations.  Delay, after all, gives the laggard's 
rivals time to advance their research, possibly far enough to file for the patent and 
in that way nullify the laggard's threat. 
  
Moreover, for negotiations like this to work, the laggard would have to 
develop a mechanism by which it could credibly commit to go ahead and disclose 
its research should the negotiations fail.  That is, just because a laggard has 
research information that might preempt a rival's patent application, and even if the 
laggard is able to prove the existence of that information (for example, by bringing 
to the negotiating table a copy of some ready-to-publish research article), the 
laggard still has to show that publicly disclosing the information is consistent with 
the laggard's own interests.  Phrased another way, the leader needs assurances that 
this is indeed a laggard who has such a small chance of leapfrogging that it is 
willing to destroy patent value in order to guarantee itself the ability to compete in 
the subset market, rather than an opportunistic laggard who would not actually go 
ahead with public disclosure were that its only option.  
 
                                                           
62 Although, to whatever extent the laggard has the option of triggering a 102(b) or 102(e) bar by 
"quietly" disclosing research information (see supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text), Arrow's dilemma 
is to some degree reintroduced. 
63 See Fudenberg & Tirole, supra note 49, at 243-318 (games of private information). 
64 See Tirole, supra note 60, at 21-25 (bilateral monopoly); Robert D. Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. 
Legal Stud. 1, 23 (1982) (breakdowns in negotiation). 
65 See Andreu Mas-colell et al., Microeconomic Theory 359-64 (1995) (free-rider problem).  Note, too, 
that in multi-firm settings transaction costs might also become a more significant problem.  A single public 
disclosure has the same cost no matter how many parties are affected; the transaction costs for private 
negotiations, by contrast, grow with the number of parties involved. 
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Lastly, in various ways the legal system limits the viability of private 
negotiations of the sort considered here.  There is the obvious concern that these 
agreements among rivals might in certain factual settings either violate antitrust 
law or constitute patent misuse, especially in cases where the patent will ultimately 
give the patentee significant market power.66  More interestingly, however, the 
prior art rules themselves might make private negotiations precarious.  
Specifically, private negotiations might raise prior art concerns under section 
102(b)'s "on sale" bar.  A laggard engaged in one of these private negotiations is in 
essence offering to sell its rights and interests in an invention.  True, under 
conventional interpretations, the on-sale bar does not apply to transactions 
concerning patent rights, but only to transactions concerning products (that is, 
embodiments of patent rights.)  However, there is little case law support for this 
distinction;67 and, if the policy behind the on-sale bar is to prohibit early 
commercialization, it would seem that payments from leader to laggard should 
trigger the bar—especially given that, in the cases under consideration here, the 
laggard has reduced the invention to practice and is playing a laggard strategy only 
because its rival has legal priority in the American first-to-invent scheme.68 
 
IV.  STRATEGIC DISCLOSURE BY LEADERS 
 
 The previous section focused on disclosure strategies as they might be used 
by trailing firms; this section turns its attention to leaders.  Because the incentives 
here are perhaps less intuitive than they were in the laggard case, we begin this 
section with a discussion of why leaders might disclose, including two simple 
numeric examples to help explain the concept.  Then we present a formal model 
that both generalizes our numeric examples and isolates more clearly the factors 
critical to a leading firm's decision.  Third and finally, we consider whether 
strategic disclosure by leaders furthers patent system goals and, in the course of 
that discussion, again confront the possibility of private negotiations. 
 
                                                           
66 It might turn out that patent misuse is inapplicable here because the negotiations are taking place 
before any patent issues.  However, patent misuse is an equitable doctrine, and thus courts might find that 
negotiations in anticipation of a patent are sufficiently linked to that patent so as to make misuse analysis 
appropriate.  This would certainly be the case where the negotiations result in the laggard being given a 
license to use what later becomes the patented technology.  For discussion, see Merges, supra note 12, at 
1151-52 (differential royalties as possible patent misuse).  
67 See Merges, supra note 12, at 312 (discussing Moleculon case); Adelman et al., supra note 12, at 248 
(same).  Cf. Ferag AG v. Quipp, Inc., 45 F.3d 1562 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied, 116 S.Ct. 71 (1995) (on sale 
bar implicated when one firm sold on-going research to independent second firm). 
68 Prior art rules might interfere with private negotiations in another way as well: the very act of sharing 
secret research information with a rival—even as part of a negotiation—might be deemed to be a "public 
use" under section 102(b).  Cf., e.g., Baxter, supra note 21.  This concern could be mitigated, however, 
through the use of confidentiality agreements, hence we relegate the issue to this footnote. 
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A.  Two Simple Examples 
 
A firm that is "leading" a patent race in the sense of having already 
conceived the invention at issue has no reason to engage in strategic disclosure.  
Having conceived, such a firm need not worry about trailing researchers; the patent 
system accords priority to the first party to conceive an invention even if another 
party is first to reduce it to practice or first to apply for a patent.  Thus, to whatever 
extent a leader is confident that it has conceived, the leader should focus not on 
strategic disclosure, but instead on pursuing its research with appropriate 
diligence.69 
 
For a firm that is ahead in its research but has not yet conceived, however, 
strategic disclosure might be attractive.  Disclosure can drive laggards from the 
race in either of two ways: it can so lessen the expected value of the patent that the 
laggards no longer have sufficient incentive to continue the race; or it can signal to 
the laggards exactly how far behind they really are, which is sobering information 
that might not otherwise be available in the often secretive competitive research 
process.  Driving laggards from the race—or, in less extreme cases, reducing 
laggards' incentives to pursue the patent vigorously—benefits the leader by 
decreasing the danger that one of the laggards will leapfrog the leader and claim 
the patent.  It also benefits the leader by allowing the firm to slow its research to a 
more efficient pace, the exact speed determined more by the relative costs and 
benefits of bringing the invention to market sooner, and less by the fear of losing 
the patent race.  Disclosure has its costs, however: disclosures might inadvertently 
help trailing firms gain ground on the leader, and disclosures might also limit the 
scope of any patent the leader might ultimately obtain.70   
 
 Two numeric examples help clarify this dynamic.71  First, suppose that two 
inventors each face a cost of thirty-five to continue a given patent race, but that 
one inventor (the leader) has a sixty percent chance of being first to conceive while 
the other inventor (the laggard) has only a forty percent chance of being first.  
                                                           
69 See supra note 55 (discussing diligence).  One qualification here is that there is always some risk that 
a court will disagree with the firm regarding its evidence with respect to conception, diligence, or both; to 
whatever extent that is true, these firms should continue to consider the possibility of strategic disclosure. 
70 Parchomovsky for the most part does not consider the possibility of strategic disclosure by leaders in 
his article, cited supra note 2.  His only reference to the concept comes in his Part IV, where he argues that 
a leader might disclose information so as to somehow preempt laggard disclosures.  That argument is in 
error; if a leader were to disclose information in the way Parchomovsky suggests in his piece, those 
disclosures would not preempt laggard disclosures, they would instead simply start the clock on a one-year 
section 102(b) bar.  
71 Note that these are just toy examples, the numbers specifically chosen so as to make clear the 
intuitions.  Different numbers can of course lead to different conclusions.  We present our case more 
rigorously in the formal model that follows. 
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Assume the expected value of the patent to be one hundred.  On these numbers, 
both firms are willing to remain in the patent race so long as no strategic disclosure 
takes place.  The leader's expected payoff is twenty-five, while the laggard's 
expected payoff is five.  The top panel of figure 1 captures this state of affairs. 
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FIGURE 1.  STRATEGIC DISCLOSURE FOR THE PURPOSE  
OF DIMINISHING PATENT VALUE.  
 
 Were the leader to disclose information, the payoffs would change in 
several dimensions, as shown in the bottom panel of figure 1.  First, the disclosure 
would likely decrease the expected value of the patent since there would be some 
chance that the disclosure would ultimately be deemed to have raised a statutory 
bar or rendered some aspect of the invention obvious.  For the purposes of the 
example, imagine that this effect lowers the expected value from one hundred to 
seventy.  Second, the disclosure might narrow the gap between the leader and the 
laggard; this would happen if the disclosure communicated to the laggard helpful 
information that the laggard did not already know.  The extent of this narrowing 
likely varies sharply from case to case, but again just for purposes of the example 
suppose that after the disclosure the leader has only a fifty-five percent chance of 
being first to conceive while the laggard's chances rise to forty-five percent. 
 
 Now calculate each firm's payoff for remaining in the race.  The laggard has 
a forty-five percent chance of winning a patent worth seventy, a chance that is on 
expectation worth approximately thirty-two.  That is less than the thirty-five it 
costs to remain in the race, so the laggard now prefers to exit as opposed to 
continuing to pursue the patent.  The leader's payoff changes, too.  At the moment 
of disclosure, the expected value of the patent dropped to seventy from one 
Cost to Continue       Likelihood of Winning          Expected Patent Value
LEADER                           35                             55                                         70
LAGGARD                       35                                45                                         70
Patent Race Before Publication by Leader
And After
Cost to Continue   Likelihood of Winning          Expected Patent Value
LEADER                           35                             60                                        100
LAGGARD                       35                                40                                        100
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hundred; but now that the laggard has exited, the leader's chances of winning have 
risen from sixty percent to one hundred percent.  The leader is not only willing to 
stay in the race (spending thirty-five for an expected payoff of seventy) but is now 
better off than it was before disclosure.  Under the original scenario, the leader 
expected a net payoff of twenty-five; by using strategic disclosure, the leader has 
raised its expected payoff to thirty-five.72 
 
 The preceding numeric example shows how strategic disclosure by the 
leader might so diminish the expected value of the patent that the laggard would 
abandon the race.  The example that follows highlights the second reason strategic 
disclosure might cause a trailing firm to exit: the disclosure might help the laggard 
better understand how far ahead the leader actually is.  The top panel of figure 2 
again shows two inventors who each face a cost of thirty-five to continue a given 
patent race.  Again in this example the expected value of the patent is one hundred, 
but this time one inventor (the leader) has an eighty percent chance of being first to 
conceive while the other inventor (the laggard) has only a twenty percent chance.  
The laggard does not know enough about the leader's research to correctly estimate 
its odds of winning the race, however, so instead of thinking it has a twenty-
percent chance of conceiving first, the laggard mistakenly estimates its chances to 
be sixty percent.  Under these conditions, both inventors are willing to remain in 
the race.  The leader has an eighty percent chance of earning one hundred, a total 
that offsets its costs of thirty-five and leaves an expected net gain of forty-five.  
The laggard mistakenly believes that it has a sixty percent chance of earning one 
hundred, so it too thinks it worthwhile to spend thirty-five and stay in the race. 
                                                           
72 When the laggard exits the race, it might disclose its research, attempting to play the spoiler strategy 
analyzed in Part III.  This likely will have little effect, however, since the leader already has disclosed some 
information and the laggard can thus only do harm, if it can do any harm at all under the law, to the extent it 
has information beyond that which was already disclosed. 
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          FIGURE 2.  STRATEGIC DISCLOSURE AS SIGNALING. 
 
 If the leader discloses information, the payoffs change.  For one thing, the 
disclosure will help the laggard more accurately estimate its own chance of 
winning the race to conceive.  The disclosure might also inadvertently increase the 
laggard's ability to win, so in this example perhaps the overall effect will leave the 
laggard with something above a twenty percent chance of winning, say thirty 
percent.  As prior art, the disclosure might also diminish the expected value of the 
patent.73  For the sake of argument, let us assume, then, that after disclosure the 
expected value of the patent drops to eighty-five.  The bottom panel of figure 2 
reflects these updated numbers. 
 
 Calculating the incentives once more, we see that disclosure has again 
caused the laggard to leave the race.  Better information about its odds of winning 
and the lower patent value have so reduced its expected payoff that continuing the 
race is not worthwhile.  The leader, however, is better off than it was before.  With 
the laggard gone, the leader has a greater chance of winning the patent.  Even 
though the patent value is diminished, the net effect in this example gives the 
leader an expected payoff of fifty, five more than the original expected payoff of 
forty-five. 
                                                           
73 Perhaps not, however, since the disclosure might in some cases signal the leader's relative position 
without actually revealing much in the way of invention details.  See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying 
text.  But see supra note 72 (noting that the laggard might disclose upon exit). 
                          Cost to Continue          Likelihood of Winning          Expected Patent Value
                (Actual & Perceived)
LEADER                        35                                 70 / 70        85
LAGGARD                    35                  30 / 30                                           85
Patent Race Before Publication by Leader
And After
                          Cost to Continue          Likelihood of Winning          Expected Patent Value
                (Actual & Perceived)
LEADER                        35                                 80 / 80       100
LAGGARD                    35                  20 / 60                                          100
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B.  A Game Theoretic Model of Leader Disclosure 
 
As it was with the spoiler strategy discussed in Part III, the effects and 
interactions considered here can be modeled more formally.  Denote once more by 
A and B two firms engaged in a patent race.  Let x represent the expected value of 
the patent assuming no disclosures prior to patenting, and let xβ  represent the 
expected value of the patent if one of the firms engages in strategic disclosure.  
Note that we use β  and not α in this model since the disclosures in this model 
implicate slightly different legal rules than did the disclosures in the previous 
model, and so the degree of patent degradation might differ.  Naturally, [ ]1,0∈β . 
 
Similar to the laggard model, we model this patent race as a three-stage 
game of incomplete information where everything is common knowledge except 
for the rival's position in the race.  The game proceeds as follows.  There is again a 
first stage of research, after which a firm that has successfully completed the stage 
can choose to disclose information.  As before, the two firms make this decision 
simultaneously.  If a firm does disclose, (1) the expected value of the patent 
decreases because of the prior art rules; (2) its rival learns that the disclosing firm 
has completed the first stage of research and the rival updates its own perceived 
likelihood of winning the patent race accordingly; and (3) the rival learns whatever 
information was disclosed, and in that way its research is advanced.  The firms 
then each decide whether to incur the costs of proceeding to a second stage of 
research.  Once a firm has completed that second stage, the race is over and the 
patent issues with some probability.  Notice that, at the moment of possible 
disclosure, each firm is one of two types: either already finished with the first stage 
of research, or not yet finished.  This is the private information.     
 
Define the stage one and stage two investment technologies as follows.  If a 
firm i (where },{ BAi∈ ) invests ic1 , then it completes the first stage of research 
with probability 1p .  At stage two, whether a firm that invests ic2  receives the 
patent depends on (1) whether the rival firm completed the first stage of research 
and (2) whether either firm disclosed information after the first stage.  More 
formally, if we use subscript "d" to indicate disclosure, "a" to indicate that the firm 
is ahead in its research, "s" to indicate that both firms successfully completed the 
first stage, “f” to indicate that both firms failed to complete the first stage, and “o” 
to indicate that the firm is the only one remaining in the race, we can write: 
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The above probabilities are related.  Most obviously, a firm enjoys its best 
chance of winning the patent race if the other firm drops out.  Its next best chance 
comes when it has successfully completed the first stage but its rival has not.  If a 
firm in that situation chooses to disclose information, it decreases its own chance 
of winning the race since any disclosure might reveal information that would help 
the rival.  The firm's chances of winning are worse still if both firms successfully 
complete the first stage; at least in the previous case the disclosing firm was ahead 
in its research.  A firm's chances diminish even further if neither it nor its rival has 
completed stage one.  This might be better, but might be worse, than being behind 
the rival but benefiting from its disclosures.  The worse case by far, though, is 
having failed to complete the first stage while the rival both completes the first 
stage and chooses not to disclose.  In short, 
 
01 0 >><>>>>>
>
bbdfsada ppppppp . 
 
 As before, we solve this game of incomplete information by using the 
perfect Bayesian equilibrium solution concept.  Again, for ease of exposition we 
focus on one representative separating equilibrium. 
 
Proposition 2:  There exists, for certain parameter configurations, a separating 
equilibrium where a firm that completes the first stage of research chooses to 
engage in strategic disclosure.  In this equilibrium each firm invests at stage one; 
firms that complete the first stage of research disclose information; firms exit the 
race if they realize they are lagging; and all firms that remain in the race invest at 
stage two. 
 
To prove this proposition we need to show that each firm is acting optimally 
given the equilibrium strategy of its rival and its own beliefs.  We start at the 
second stage of research.  A firm that has failed stage one and observed disclosure 
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by its rival will exit the race if the costs of going forward exceed the expected 
returns, or so long as: 
 
ibd cxp 2)4( <β . 
 
 A firm that has completed stage one and observed disclosure knows that 
both it and its rival have completed the first stage.  Such a firm will invest at stage 
two if the benefits from investment outweigh the costs, or if 
 
is cxp 2)5( >β . 
 
If equation (5) holds, a firm that realizes it is ahead in the race will also 
choose to invest at stage two. 
 
A firm that has failed to complete stage one and has not observed disclosure 
thereby knows that both firms have failed stage one because firms that complete 
stage one disclose.  This firm will invest at stage two if the benefits from 
investment outweigh the costs, or so long as: 
 
if cxp 2)6( > . 
 
 We have just shown the conditions under which the equilibrium strategy 
investment decisions at stage two are optimal.  Moving backward in the game, we 
must now show that the expected payoff from disclosure is greater than the 
expected payoff from a failure to disclose.  Again using the variable v to represent 
the value of the opportunity to compete in the subset market,74 the expected payoff 
to a firm from disclosure, given its rival’s equilibrium strategy, is: 
 
iosdisclosure cvxppvxppEP 211 ))(1()( −+−++= ββ . 
 
Three terms make-up this expected payoff.  The first term is the firm's payoff if it 
discloses and it happens to turn out that the rival firm also has completed stage 
one.  This term is discounted by the firm’s belief that its rival has, in fact, 
completed stage one.  The second term is the firm's payoff from inducing the 
laggard to exit.  This term is discounted by the firm's belief that it is actually 
leading the race (i.e., that the rival firm has failed stage one).  The final term 
represents the costs of stage two research. 
 
                                                           
74 In this model, given the change in variables, ])1(,0[ 21 xv β−∈ . 
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 The expected payoff to a firm that chooses not to disclose, given its rival’s 
equilibrium strategy, is: 
 
iasDisclosureNo cxppvxppEP 211 ))(1()( −−++= β . 
 
This expected payoff again consists of three terms.  The first term is the payoff if 
this firm completes stage one, chooses not to disclose, and ends up tied with the 
rival firm.  In this case, consistent with the equilibrium strategies, the rival does 
disclose, and hence the expected value of the patent is reduced.  The second term 
is the payoff if the firm completes stage one, chooses not to disclose, and ends up 
leading the race.  In this case, the firm has not induced its rival to exit and so the 
firm faces competition from its rival at stage two.  The third term once more 
represents the costs incurred at stage two. 
 
 Comparing the expected payoff from disclosure with the expected payoff 
from a failure to disclose, we see that disclosure is optimal so long as the 
following condition holds: 
 
xpxpv ao >+ β)7( . 
 
 Like equation (2) in the prior model, equation (7) here gives us the most 
insight into the leader's incentives with respect to strategic disclosure.  The left-
hand side of the equation represents the leader's payoff if it chooses to disclose and 
that disclosure drives the laggard from the race: the leader earns profits from the 
subset market (v) plus has some chance ( op ) of earning the partially preempted 
patent ( xβ ).  The right-hand side represents its payoff if it foregoes disclosure and 
simply continues in the race: it has some chance ( ap ) of earning the full patent (x).  
Naturally, the condition tells us that the leader will choose disclosure when its 
payoff from disclosure is larger than the payoff it expects to earn without 
disclosure. 
 
 To complete the proof, we need to show that it is optimal for each firm to 
invest at stage one.  This is true if the expected cost of investing at stage one is less 
than the expected benefit from investing at stage one, or so long as: 
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Once again, this is a somewhat inelegant but simple equation.  The four terms 
capture four states of the world.  The first term represents the payoff if both firms 
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complete stage one.  In this state of the world, both firms complete the stage, 
disclose, and then attempt to win the race by investing at stage two.  The second 
term represents the payoff to a firm when it is the only firm to complete stage one.  
In this state of the world, the successful firm discloses, this induces the rival firm 
to exit, and then the leading firm invests at stage two.  The third term represents 
the opposite case, namely that the rival completes the first stage, discloses, and 
drives this firm from the race.  The only payoff here are the returns from the subset 
market.  The fourth and final term represents the payoff if neither firm completes 
stage one successfully.  In this case, neither firm discloses and subsequently each 
attempts to win the patent by investing at stage two.  If the sum of these four terms 
is greater than the investment cost at stage one, then it is optimal for each firm to 
invest at stage one. 
 
Given equations (4)-(8), no firm can deviate from its equilibrium strategy 
and increase its payoff consistent with its beliefs and the equilibrium strategy of its 
rival.  Thus, if the parameters of the model are such that these equations are 
satisfied, then the strategies outlined in proposition 2 constitute a perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium. 
 
C.  Policy Implications and Private Bargaining 
 
 As it was with the laggard strategy, from a policy perspective strategic 
disclosure by leaders is appealing mainly because these disclosures place 
information in the public domain earlier than the patent system otherwise would. 
There are two interrelated points here: the public becomes aware of the 
information earlier than it would through the normal publication of patent 
applications, and the public can use the information more efficiently since any 
information disclosed is not subject to patent protection.  Moreover, strategic 
disclosure does not take the place of patent application disclosures in this setting; 
quite the opposite, in settings where a leader discloses, any early revelations will 
later be followed by fuller disclosures since leaders who strategically publish 
typically still intend to actually file patent applications on some related 
technology.75 
 
 All this again only suggests that strategic disclosure might be attractive 
from a societal point of view—although the case in favor of strategic disclosure by 
                                                           
75 On the other hand, if there were no strategic disclosure, trailing firms would more often remain in the 
patent race, and in some cases they would either push the leader to achieve the invention more quickly or 
themselves leapfrog the leader and achieve the invention.  Each of these options would lead to earlier 
patenting and, hence, earlier disclosure.  Thus, while strategic disclosures will indeed be followed in most 
cases by patent applications, those applications will likely come later in time than they would have had there 
not been strategic disclosure. 
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leaders does seem stronger than the one for strategic disclosure by laggards.  This 
is true because, to whatever extent leader disclosures help laggards more 
realistically estimate their chances of winning a given patent race, the disclosures 
make possible more efficient research decisions.  That benefits laggards (who 
avoid wasting their research dollars) and also makes for a better use of societal 
resources.  The strategy does change payoffs for both leaders and laggards, 
however, for example increasing the expected payoff for leaders (who now have 
some ability to drive out laggards), increasing the expected payoff to laggards to 
the extent that they avoid wasteful research investments, and decreasing the 
expected payoff to laggards to whatever extent they leave the race only because the 
patent's value was diminished through disclosure.  Again, we cannot adequately 
evaluate the merits of these sorts of incentive shifts without first developing a 
fuller model of how the patent system works, something that goes far beyond the 
scope of this project. 
 
 As for the concern that inventors might use private negotiations to displace 
public disclosures, in this setting private alternatives are at times quite plausible 
and at other times rather unlikely.  Private alternatives seem plausible to whatever 
extent leaders disclose in order to signal their relative positions vis-a-vis laggards.  
Suppose, for example, that a public demonstration of some new technology was 
going to serve as a credible signal of a leader's position.  Instead of going public, 
the leader should (and could quite easily) arrange to give that demonstration to its 
rivals on the side.  The demonstration's value as a signal would be identical, but, 
by doing it privately instead of publicly, the leader would minimize the chance that 
the disclosure would come back to partially preempt its ultimate patent 
application.76  The only reason, in fact, for a leader to choose a public signal as 
opposed to a private one would be if the leader was unsure of the identities of its 
rivals and so had to use at least some measure of public disclosure as a way of 
identifying the relevant parties. 
 
By contrast, to whatever extent leaders disclose information as a way of 
eroding patent value and thereby undermining a rival's incentive to race, private 
negotiations seem difficult at best.  The difficulty comes in specifying by contract 
exactly what the laggard is supposed to do.  Were a leader in this setting to 
publish, laggard behavior is straightforward: the publication would change the 
expected value of the patent, and the laggard's incentive to continue in the race 
would be correspondingly diminished.  The laggard might drop out, compete less 
                                                           
76 One interesting wrinkle: if a laggard in this case refused to sign a confidentiality agreement, the 
leader's arguably private disclosure might be deemed "public" for the purposes of sections 102(b) and 103, 
defeating the leader's purpose in choosing a "private" as opposed to a public disclosure.  See supra note 68.  
Here again, then, the leader might be forced to engage in some negotiation. 
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vigorously, and so on.  To simulate that result by contract, however, the firms 
would have to agree on exactly what the laggard can and cannot do, all the while 
negotiating in a context where the technology at issue is still under development 
and thus poorly defined.  Monitoring compliance with such a contract would also 
likely prove both difficult and expensive, and that—taken together with the 
difficulties inherent in drafting the contract; standard negotiating impediments like 
private information, bilateral monopoly, and free-rider problems; and the legal 
constraints discussed in Section III.C.—might in the end cause race leaders to opt 
for public disclosure even though private negotiations could in theory make both 
laggards and leaders better off.77 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
   
 Strategic disclosure is not entirely a reaction to law.  When a firm discloses 
research information, that disclosure has three effects: it gives rivals some 
information about how close the disclosing firm is to accomplishing the invention; 
it assists rivals by giving them possibly valuable information about the invention; 
and it affects the expected value of any patent that might eventually cover the 
invention, whether applied for by the disclosing party or a rival.  Law—
specifically the prior art rules—has significant influence over only the last of these 
effects, and thus the incentive to disclose information is in part, but only in part, 
determined by legal rules. 
 
 That said, modest changes to the prior art inquiry could surely encourage or 
discourage strategic disclosure in various settings, and so one direction for further 
research would be to explore possible changes to the prior art system that might 
encourage beneficial forms of strategic disclosure.  For example, if we believe that 
strategic disclosure by leaders is desirable whereas strategic disclosure by laggards 
is not, prior art rules could be adjusted such that the ultimate patentee's pre-
patenting disclosures have less of an effect on its ability to patent than they do on a 
rival's ability to patent.  That is, prior art rules could be adjusted so as to make it 
less costly for ultimate patentees to disclose while leaving intact the effect those 
disclosures have on other firms.   
   
                                                           
77 Again, as was explained supra note 61, leaders might not prefer private negotiations even in cases 
where they are easy to accomplish.  True, if there is no chance of additional entry in a given race, private 
negotiations are a no-brainer: they salvage patent value and generate a surplus that all the parties can share.  
In instances where new firms can still enter the patent race, however, the leader has to account for the fact 
that, by increasing the race payoffs, he might inadvertently encourage entry—bringing in new firms that, 
much to his chagrin, could end up either competing with him in earnest, or researching just enough such that 
they, too, can demand bribes. 
 40
 Further research also should include empirical research on the question of 
whether firms do, under current legal rules, or would, under a modified prior art 
regime, engage in strategic disclosure.  Research firms obviously disclose 
information all the time, but whether any of these disclosures are made with an eye 
toward their effects on patentability is unclear.  For example, firms might allow 
employees to participate in trade shows or publish articles in industry periodicals 
not because of patent system strategy but, instead, as a way of generating favorable 
publicity for the firm or as a form of in-kind employee compensation since giving 
talks and writing articles both enhance employee resumes.  Rebecca Eisenberg has 
found some evidence that firms trailing in the race to map the human genome have 
engaged in strategic disclosure in the hopes of thwarting rivals' patent 
applications;78 but, before the analysis presented here can be fruitfully applied, 
more work of this sort clearly should be pursued. 
                                                           
78 Eisenberg, supra note 12; Rebecca Eisenberg, Genomics in the Public Domain: Strategy and Policy, 
1 NATURE REVIEW 70 (2000).  Further empirical work might build on some of the existing studies of private 
sector disclosures, for example Diana Hicks, Published Papers, Tacit Competencies, and Corporate 
Management of the Public/Private Character of Knowledge, 4 IND. & CORP. CHANGE 401 (1995).  Another 
approach might be to pursue a case study, for example considering the IBM Technical Disclosure Bulletin, 
a series of technical disclosures published directly by IBM from 1958 until 1998 and, ever since, published 
by an outside firm under IBM's auspices.  See http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/ibm_tdb <visited October 
1, 2000>. 
